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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence of driving under the
influence.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On December 29, 2007, City of Sandpoint police officer Derrick Hagstrom initiated a
traffic stop of Matthew Gilbert Scott (Scott). (Tr., p. 3, L. 15 - p. 4, L. 2.) Officer Hagstrom
was on patrol and had stopped at a stop sign behind Scott just after Scott had pulled away from
the same stop sign. (Tr., p. 4, L. 12; L. 15-23.) After Scott pulled away from the stop sign,
Officer Hagstrom remained stationary at the stop sign and observed Scott accelerate to 32 miles
per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. (Tr., p. 4, L. 22 - p. 5, L. 2; p. 11, Ls. 21-22.) Scott was
inside the city limits of Sandpoint when Officer Hagstrom observed this traffic violation. (Tr., p.
6, Ls. 17-19.) Scott was travelling west on Pine Street and was in the Fifteen-hundred block of
Pine Street at the time of the speeding violation. (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 15-16; p. 6, Ls. 19-21.) At
hearing, Officer Hagstrom gave inconsistent estimates of the distance fiom the location of the
speeding violation to the edge of city limits. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 19-24.; p. 13, Ls. 17-19.) After
observing the speeding violation, Officer Hagstrom attempted to catch up to Scott. (Tr., p. 5, Ls.
12-14.) It was snowing heavily at the time and there was approximately four inches of snow on
the ground. (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-15.)

Both vehicles were outside city limits before Officer

Hagstrom activated his overhead lights. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-7.) At hearing, Scott estimated that
Officer Hagstrom was about one mile outside of city limits at the time of the stop. (Tr., p. 18,
Ls. 14-19).

As a result of the stop Scott was charged with misdemeanor DUI, second offense. (R., p.
20.)

Scott moved to suppress the evidence against him.

(R., p. 37.) After hearing, the

magistrate court concluded that when Officer Hagstrom exited city limits he was not in fresh
pursuit of Scott, and therefore did not have la*l

authority to stop Scott. (R., pp. 48-49.)

The state appealed the magistrate's order to district court. (R., pp. 50-51.) The district
court affirmed the magistrate's order. (R., pp. 79-88.) The state now appeals to this court. (R.,
pp. 89-92.)

ISSUES

1.

Did The Magistrate Court Err When It Concluded That Officer Hagstrom Was Not In
Fresh Pursuit Of Scott?

2.

Is Suppression The Appropriate Remedy For Officer Hagstrom's Illegal Stop Of Scott?

ARGUMENT
1.
The Magistrate Court Was Correct In Concludina That Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh
Pursuit Of Scott When He Left His Territorial Jurisdiction
A.

Introduction
It is not in dispute that Officer Hagstrom initiated and conducted his traffic stop of Scott

outside of the city limits of Sandpoint, Officer Hagstrom's territorial jurisdiction. Under some
circumstances this would be allowed. The state contends that the fresh pursuit exception should
apply in this case. The trial court, however, concluded that Officer Hagstrom was not in fresh
pursuit of Scott and that Officer Hagstrom had "ample opportunity" to initiate a traffic stop
inside Sandpoint city limits. This court should not disturb the Magistrate's factual conclusion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by
substantial evidence are accepted, but the appellate court freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,789,979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999).
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, the
appellate court reviews the decision of the district court directly. State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 709,
71 1, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). The reviewing court examines the magistrate record to

determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id
If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, the district court's decision is affirmed as a matter of
procedure. Id.
C.

Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh Pursuit As Defined By Idaho Statute
Police officers of the State of Idaho are generally not allowed to operate outside the

territorial area of their employing city or political subdivision. Idaho Code 67-2337(2):
All authority that applies to peace officers when performing their assigned
functions and duties within the territorial limits of the respective city or political
subdivisions, where they are employed, shall apply to them outside such territorial
limits to the same degree and extent only when any one (1) of the following
conditions exist:
(a) A request for law enforcement assistance is made by a law enforcement
agency of said jurisdiction.
(b) The peace officer possesses probable cause to believe a crime is occurring
involving a felony or an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to any
person.
(c) When a peace officer is in fresh pursuit as defined in and pursuant to chapter
7, title 19, Idaho Code.
(emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that either subsections (a) or (b)
apply in this case. "Fresh pursuit" is the only possible justification for Officer Hagstrom
conducting a traffic stop outside of Sandpoint. Idaho Code 50-209 would also provide a fresh
pursuit exception to Officer Hagstrom:
The policemen of every city, should any be appointed, shall have power to arrest
all offenders against the law of the state, or of the city, by day or by night, in the
same manner as the sheriff or constable. Whenever such policemen shall be in
fresh pursuit of any offender against any law of the state, including traffic
infractions, or of the city and the offense has been committed within the corporate
limits of such city, such policemen, while in such fresh pursuit may go beyond the
corporate or geographical limits of such city subject to the provisions of chapter 7,
title 19, Idaho Code, for the purpose of making such arrest or citation.

Fresh pursuit is authorized in Idaho Code 19-701A:
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably
believed by him to have committed a felony in this state or has committed, or
attempted to commit, any criminal offense or traffic infraction in this state in the
presence of such officer, or for whom a warrant of arrest is outstanding for a
criminal offense, shall have authority to pursue, arrest and hold in custody or cite
such person anywhere in this state.
Idaho Code 19-705 defines "fresh pursuityy:
The term "fresh pursuit" as used in this act shall include fresh pursuit as defined
by the common law1, and also the pursuit of a person who has committed a felony
or who is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. It shall also include
the pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony, though
no felony has actually been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing
that a felony has been committed. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall not
necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
The above statutes, read together, stand for the common-sense proposition that if a law
enforcement officer, while attempting to seize a law-breaker, happens to follow the law-breaker
across a geographic boundary, the officer has authority to arrest wherever it is the two arrive.
These statutes are relatively straightforward and the Respondent is not going to invite any
statutory interpretation.
This exception simply does not come into play in this case. Officer Hagstrom's attention
was drawn to Scott because of a speeding violation. Thereafter, Officer Hagstrom followed and
observed Scott, eventually leaving the City of Sandpoint. The magistrate court is the finder of
fact. The court receives testimony in person and has an opportunity to personally observe the
credibility of witnesses.

During testimony, Officer Hagstrom indicated on an exhibit the

approximate locations of relevant occurrences. (Tr., p. 12, L. 19

-

p. 13, L. 24.) Officer

Hagstrom first testified on direct that Scott was as close as "an eighth of a mile probably"2 to the
edge of city limits. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 23-24.) He also testified that the distance was several hundred
1

As argued below, common law fiesh pursuit is not an issue in this case.
One eighth of a mile equals 660 feet.

yards. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 21-23.) Later, on redirect, Officer Hagstrom agreed that there are several
businesses and "other entities" between the point where Scott committed the speeding violation
and a train bridge previously identified as the approximate location of city limits. (Tr., p. 11, Ls.
23 - p. 12., L. 1; p. 13, Ls. 9-13.) Officer Hagstrom identified the businesses and other entities
as "three apartment complexes.. . a substation, athletic club, city park, and a school." (Tr., p. 13,
Ls. 14-16.) Officer Hagstrom agreed that it was a "significant distance" between the location of
the speeding violation and city limits. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 17-19.) The magistrate received this
somewhat conflicting information and made a factual determination as to the distance and length
of time that Officer Hagstrom followed Scott while inside Sandpoint city limits. The magistrate
concluded that there was "ample opportunity" for Officer Hagstrom to activate his overhead
lights while he and Scott were within the city limits of Sandpoint. (R., p. 48.) The state has
argued that the "touchstone of 'fresh pursuit' is 'pursuit without unreasonable delay."'
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) That may be so, but it is beside the point. The magistrate concluded in
this case that there was unreasonable delay in Officer Hagstrom's pursuit of Scott.

D.

Officer Hagstrom Was Not In Fresh Pursuit As Defined By Common Law
Common law fresh pursuit is not an issue in this case. It is not necessary to repeat the

above argument. Common law fresh pursuit, as applied to the facts of this case, is either
narrower or coextensive with the statutory definition. Of the four cases cited by the state that
interpret fresh pursuit, two are interpreting similarly worded state statutes. The two others are
Poss v. State and State v. Nysus.
In Poss v. State, the Georgia court alludes to a common law rule of "hot pursuit,"3 but the
rule is not defined in the opinion or in any of the cases cited by the opinion. Poss v. State, 167

There is overlap in the use of the terms "hot pursuit" and "fkesh pursuit" and it appears that the two are sometimes
used interchangeably. Whether there is a substantive difference is, fortunately, not an issue to decide in this case.

7

Ga.App. 86, 87, 305 S.E.2d 884, 885 (Ga. App. 1983). About the rule, whatever it might
specifically say, the court stated that hot pursuit is characterized by "continuity and immediacy."
Id at 88, 886. This is similar to Idaho's statutory requirement of "pursuit without unreasonable

delay." I.C.

19-705.

In State v. Nysus, the New Mexico court recited a definition for fresh pursuit: "[tlhe
common law doctrine of fresh pursuit allows a peace officer to arrest beyond the boundaries of
his jurisdiction only in pursuit of a person believed to have committed a felony." State v. Nysus,
131 N.M. 338, 343, 35 P. 3d 993, 998 (N.M. App. 2001) (citing Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M.
463, 466, 553 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1976)). At all times prior to the stop, Scott was being
investigated for violation of a traffic infraction, much less a misdemeanor or felony. The
common law rule of fresh pursuit, as articulated by the courts of New Mexico, requires the
officer to be investigating a felony and as such does not apply to this case.

Suppression Is The Appropriate Remedy For Officer Hagstrom's Illegal Stop Of Scott
A.

Introduction
The state argues in the alternative that if Officer Hagstrom's stop of Scott was violative of

Idaho law, that suppression is not an appropriate remedy.

B.

Standard Of Review

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bihcated. When a decision on a motion to
suppress is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial
evidence are accepted, but the appellate court freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996).

C.

The Issue Was Not Properly Preserved For Appeal
At hearing and during intermediate appeal the state did not argue against suppression as

an appropriate remedy in this case. It is well settled that in general, issues not raised below may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151,
1155 (Ct. App. 1998). The magistrate court did not specifically explore whether Scott's
constitutional rights were violated because the state did not raise it as an issue. The argument is
therefore waived and should not be considered by this Court.
D.

Officer Hagstrom's Stop Of Scott Was A Seizure Not Authorized Under Idaho Law And
Suppression Is Therefore The Appropriate Remedy
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

5

17 of the Idaho

Constitution protect citizens fiom unreasonable search and seizure. "Stopping an automobile
and detaining its occupants will be deemed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 'even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. "' State v. Simpson, 112
Idaho 644, 645, 734 P.2d 669, 670 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653,99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96 (1979)). Evidence obtained by searches and seizures made in
violation of this constitutional right is inadmissible against the accused. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectuate the rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment by deterring law enforcement officials fiom violating
constitutional protections. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492,96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051 (1976); State
v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 558,21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct.App.2001). Because the exclusionary rule

imposes a price upon society that can enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary
rule is only applicable if there is a causal connection between the police misconduct and the
acquisition of the challenged evidence. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct.

3380, 3385-86 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18
(1963); State v. Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 918, 174 P.3d 885, 888 (Ct.App.2007); State v. Babb, 136
Idaho 95,98,29 P.3d 406,409 (Ct.App.2001).
The nexus between constitutional violation and seized evidence exists in this case.
Directly at issue is Officer Hagstrom's authority to seize and detain Scott. All of the evidence
gathered against Scott necessarily comes from the traffic stop.
Peace officers may exercise authority outside the territorial limits of the city where they
are employed "only when any of any one (1) of the following conditions exist: ... (c) [fresh
pursuit." I.C.

5

67-2337(2). In this case, absent fresh pursuit, Officer Hagstrom is lacking

authority to stop Scott.
The state cites State v. BeneJiel for the proposition that suppression is not an appropriate
remedy for a traffic stop conducted by an officer outside his territorial jurisdiction. BeneJiel
contains no discussion whatsoever about the legal authority of the officer that conducted the
extra-territorial stop. State v. BeneJiel, 131 Idaho 226, 228-229, 953 P.2d 976, 979-980 (1998).
In other words, the court's opinion did not find a violation, statutory or otherwise, and then go on
to conclude that suppression was not the appropriate remedy. To the contrary, the court
specifically found that the officer in BeneJiel was acting within his lawful authority as a police
officer. Id. BeneJiel is distinguishable because it is absent in factual content similar to this case
and opposite in conclusion.

CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's appellate
decision affirming the magistrate's suppression order.
Dated this 2ndday of July 2010.
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